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1. INTRODUCTION
Political violence, conflict, terrorism cause severe dislocation to societies,
often lead to losses of human lives and destroy economic assets. The causes of
terrorism and conflict are very complex, often related to grievances associated
with perceived social and economic injustices, the quest for political power and
ethnic or religious motivations.  The prevention of conflict and terrorism (C-T
hereafter) is a very complex task that involves a combination of resources,
intelligence capacities, institutional reforms that foster a culture of dialogue and
peaceful resolution of conflict. Ultimately, economic progress and development
are essential for peace and social stability.
As conflict and terrorism produces losses of human lives and destroy
assets and property there is a need for insurance against this kind of risk. Insurance
can be provided by both the state and by the market. In countries subject to long
and violent conflict there is need for direct provision of insurance and compensation
to the victims of conflict and their families.  However, also private insurance for
C-T risks can be developed. The development of market insurance for these
contingencies require adequate pricing of C.Trisk, a solid financial base of in-
surance companies and mechanisms for shifting risk particularly when we are in
presence of  “extreme events” that severely strain the financial capacity of private
insurance companies. The losses of terrorist attacks are sometimes very large:
think, for example, of the cost of over U$ 50 billions associated with the attacks on
the twin towers on September 11, 2001, in New York City.  The “extreme event
syndrome” calls for some degree of state intervention to secure the solvency of
insurance market institutions in the wake of large contingencies. Efficient public
intervention requires an adequate understanding of issues of incentive-
compatibility, moral hazard and risk diversification that are central in the theory
and practice of insurance mechanisms.
Latin America has a long history of political violence with internal conflicts
of different intensity, ideological origins, players and dynamics and terrorist
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activities. These conflicts include civil wars, guerrilla movements, military
intervention, coup d’état, terrorism and others form of violent confrontation.
According to the United States Department of  State, the Latin American region
has the highest number of international terrorist attacks in the world, although
most of them are concentrated in a single country: Colombia1.
This paper discusses analytical and policy issues on the causes of conflict
and terrorism and the role for prevention and insurance. It also provides some
empirical evidence on the incidence of these phenomena in the Latin American and
Caribbean region in the second half of the 20th century with more concentration on
the 1990s and early 21st century. The paper examines the scope and limits of public
and market insurance for terrorism and conflict and highlights the role of public
intervention in either providing basic insurance against these contingencies and/
or in fostering the development of insurance markets for terrorism and conflict in
the Latin American region.
2. CONFLICT AND TERRORISM: DEFINITION AND SPECIAL FEATURES
Political violence, present in the history of human kind for ages, takes
several forms: wars among countries, internal conflict, guerrilla warfare, military
overthrow of civilian governments, terrorism, etc.  Thus, political violence generates
welfare costs as well as material losses. The motivations, patterns and dynamics of
conflict are multiple. The motivation of internal conflict is related to grievances
associated with unequal patterns of distribution of wealth, assets, the lack of
political rights, ideology and social exclusion2.  The propagation of conflict and its
duration depends on access to finance by combating groups and on other causes.
A recent World Bank study on civil conflict (WB, 2003) shows complex interactions
between social groups, ethnicity, access to natural resources and social exclusion
in triggering civil conflicts. In addition, this study shows that conflicts persist
over time when the rebel groups have a steady financial base that support their
fights. This can be due to the exploitation of rich natural resources with a high
liquidity value such as diamonds, oil, coca, and others. Also rebel groups often
receive financial contributions from Diasporas of nationals living abroad that
sustain the armed conflict.
 There are some important differences between conflict and terrorism.
Conflict involves regular armies and rebel groups and the scale of operations are
much large than in the case of terrorism. Terrorist groups are often smaller than
rebel armies and their targets are frequently civilians (and symbolic assets) rather
than combatants of an opposite faction, although in conflict like guerrilla warfare,
terrorism can be used by some of the factions as part of their tactics.
1 See “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, 2002, United States Department of State
2 See A. Solimano (1999)..
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3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CONFLICT AND TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Table 1 in the annex shows the incidence of armed conflict in Latin America
in the period 1946-2001, classified according different degree of intensity, internal
versus external conflict and type of rebel and insurgent groups3. The evidence
portrayed in Table 1 shows that most of the internal conflicts were motivated by
the interest of some of the groups in conflict to seize power, including the regular
army through coup de état against elected governments.  Large scale, sustained
guerrilla warfare was observed in Cuba in the 1950s, in El Salvador in the 1980s, in
Guatemala from the 1950s until the mid 1990s and in Colombia since the early 1960s
until now4.  Wars among countries have been often short lived in Latin America;
examples of this, include the conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1957,
between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and a short-lived war between Peru and
Ecuador in 1995.
What about terrorism? Table 2 shows that in the 1991-2002 period, Latin
America has the highest number of international terrorist attacks followed by
Western Europe and Asia5.  However, those attacks are highly concentrated in one
country: Colombia, that accounts for around 88 percent of the international terrorist
attacks committed in Latin America (see Table 3), followed, well-behind, by Peru. In
the 1990s, there were other high profile terrorist attacks in the region: the bombing
in 1992 of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing of the Argen-
tina-Israeli Community Center (AMIA).6
4. PREVENTION AND INSURANCE
Important policy issues are the prevention of conflict and terrorism and the
insurance against losses of life, property and destruction or damage of assets.
Preventing civil conflicts and terrorism is not a simple task. Path dependence is an
important feature of these phenomena. Countries or regions with a long history of
3 See Gleditsch, et al., 2002.
4 See Solimano, 2000 and Sanchez, Solimano and Formisano, 2003.
5 International terrorism is defined as terrorist acts that involve nationals of more than
one country and assets of international corporations besides national infrastructure.
The data on international terrorism for Latin America and other regions of the world
comes from the U.S.  State Department’s publication:  “Patterns of Global Terrorism”,
various issues.
6 Argentina also suffered from left-wing terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Important left-wing  groups that adopted violent methods were  the Montoneros and
the ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army of Argentina). Uruguay, over a similar period,
also suffered from terrorism led by the Tupamaros. In the 1980s Peru was besieged by
terrorist activity led by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). However, not all terrorist
activity has been led by left-wing groups. During the right-wing military regimes of the
1970s in the Southern Cone of Latin America, state–sponsored terror was responsible
for thousand of deaths.
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conflict and terrorism (e.g. Colombia, Northern Ireland, Israel, the Basque country
in Spain) have a higher probability of the continuation of  conflict than a country
with a history of peace and tranquility. At a broader level preventing conflict and
terrorism is a complex task that involves economic, political and legal measures. A
culture of negotiation and consensus can foster the peaceful resolution of potential
conflicts in societies. In contrast, an easy access to arms and funding availability
for rebel groups and individuals creates a better environment for conflict and
terrorism to flourish. Economic development can also help preventing conflict. In
fact, the World Bank (2003) study shows a lower incidence of armed conflict in
countries with sustained economic growth and higher levels of per capita income
than in poor and unstable countries. In contrast, the relationship between income
per capita levels and terrorism is weak: we also see that terrorism occurs in medium
income and high-income countries such as Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Spain and Israel and, recently, in the United States.
As conflict and terrorism cause economic damages and destroy human
lives, people and societies are willing to invest resources to minimize those costs.
Insurance against C-T risks can be provided by the public sector as in Spain,
Israel, Ireland and other countries. The market also can provide private insurance
for conflict and terrorism. Adequate pricing of C-T risks is one of the problems for
the development of these markets. As insurance premiums are set in line with
actuarial probabilities of events and the determinants of those probabilities, in the
case of conflict and terrorism are not well known, pricing becomes a complex issue.
Another potential impediment to the development of private insurance against
these contingencies is the so –called problem of  “extreme events” (large losses)7.
Extreme events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11  in New York City can
generate losses that often exceed the financial capacity of insurance companies.
In the twin towers attack, those losses were estimated in over 50 billion dollars (see
Jaffee and Russell, 2002)8. These events have usually a low probability of
occurrence, near 1 percent, but very high possible losses. The key for insurance
markets to operate efficiently and companies to provide insurance against large
expected losses is the existence of mechanisms to shift risks from agents that are
exposed to risk to agents that have a low position in risky assets.  Individuals or
communities exposed to the occurrence of terrorist attacks or conflict are “long” in
risky assets –say their properties or themselves are exposed to large potential
losses. They need, thus, to diversify those risks.  In turn, in the capital markets
there are agents “short” in risky assets that in exchange for an attractive return
would be willing to acquire those assets provided their risk structure is not correlated
with the risky other existing assets in their portfolios.
7 A growing new literature has started dealing with these issues. See Froot (1999),  Jafee
and Russel (2002), Niehaus (2002), Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002), Woo (2002),
Kunreuther (2002), Auffret (2003), Anderson, 2002.
8 In the case of natural disasters the hurricane Andrew that hit the state of Florida in the
U.S. in 1992 generated losses of near 20 billion dollars.
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 Insurance companies, by pooling assets with different risk distributions
(cars, houses, life insurance, etc.), can reduce the costs of managing risks. However,
in the case of conflict or big terrorist attacks their capital base, reserves and retained
profits can be insufficient to absorb the occurrence of large contingencies.
Therefore, companies face non-trivial bankruptcy risks when insuring events with
large expected losses even if their probability of occurrence is low.  To diversify
risks, the insurance company may sell part of their risky portfolio to a reinsurance
company. In turn,  re-insurance companies also need to shift the risk of their
policies to reduce insolvency risks9. For this to happen, we need a liquid capital
market that trade the suitable instruments able to transferring risk to agents with
short exposure to risk but an appetite for good returns.
 Such an instrument is a security called cat (catastrophe) bonds10.  Cat
bonds usually pay to investors a substantial premium, often near 10 percentage
points over LIBOR in exchange for an asset whose principal can be lost in the
event of a disaster to occur (unprotected principal)11.  The key element of the bond
is that in the event of extreme risk the investor may not recuperate the principal of
the bond, relieving the issuer of the Cat Bond of a large liability. The Cat bond
reduces the strain on the capital base and solvency of insurers in the event of very
large losses12.
5. PUBLIC INTERVENTION AND EFFICIENT INSURANCE
 There are several instances in which the direct provision of public insurance
is needed. For humanitarian considerations after a civil war or a large-scale conflict
the families of victims of conflict often need to be compensated. This may take the
form, for example, of for-life pensions to disabled former combatants and their
families. After the end of the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador schemes of
compensations were put in place by governments. In turn, countries such as
Spain, South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland that have traditionally suffered
from terrorist activity, governments have created public schemes of insurance
9 In Paul Samuelson (1963)’s terms the issue is to partition risk among various agents
and investors.
10 The classic theory of resource allocation of risk (Arrow, 1964, 1996; Debreu, 1959,
Borch, 1974) shown that individuals can manage efficiently their exposure to contingent
liabilities by taking (long and short) state–contingent, risk exchange securities.
In practice, catastrophe (Cat) bonds are state-contingent, risk-exchange securities
that can transfer risks across agents.
11 Alternatively, the principal can be paid over ten years. The funds raised by the Cat
bond are put in a trust account. This is another positive feature of these bonds since
this reduces the credit risk of other instruments issued by insurance companies.
12 The attractive combination of return and risk has enabled individual issuances of Cat
bonds for over 400 millions in the United States in the 1990s.
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against terrorism based on mandatory premiums and/or taxes on property (see
Jaffee and Russel, 2002)13.
Publicly provided insurance for C-T risks, in the absence of a market for
such risks, certainly fills a gap but also carry some potential costs. First, there is no
assurance that the public insurance company will properly price C-T related risk,
particularly if general taxes on property are used to generate funds for the agency.
The result may be an inefficient allocation of risk insurance. Second, although the
solvency risks of the public sector is lower than the solvency risk of private
companies given the capacity of the government to enact taxes, at social level the
risk assumed by the state may be shifted to the private sector in unanticipated and
inefficient ways (e.g. distortionary  taxes can be levied). Third, an all-encompassing
public insurance company can become a monopoly of insurance against terrorism,
conflict and other forms of human-led disaster risk. As a result of this monopoly,
competition is stifled and private markets for insurance may not develop.
 According to the theory of insurance an incentive compatible insurance
scheme is one that leaves the insured (or the insurance company) to cover the
initial layers of risk. As we move up in the risk layers, we need to go to the capital
market or be financed by the government as insurer of last resort. In fact, when the
government is willing to reinsure the top tier of losses that are beyond the capacity
of  an insurance company or government agency, then we refer to this as the
government playing the role of insurer of last resort.
In the United Kingdom the agency Pool Re (that provides terrorist insurance)
is an example of a limited liability pool (LLP) combined with an insurer of last resort,
the later function played by the British Treasury. In the United States, the California
Earthquake Agency (CEA) is a LLP but without an explicit insurer of last resort like
in the U.K.14 The combination of a state- provided LLP plus insurance of last
resort has potential incentive problems that could be avoided by a market solution
based on the securitization of insurance risk. In the British system, the allocation
of insurance for high layers of risk is made by the state that provides insurance
coverage for extreme events eliminating the risk of bankruptcy by the insurer. A
13 The case of Great Britain is interesting. A special agency called Pool Re, basically a
mutual insurance company has been set up with the purpose of providing reinsurance
of losses on commercial property sustained as a result of a terrorist attack (as defined
by an enabling statute). The British government acts a re-insurer to Pool Re, therefore
acting as an insurer of last resort, charging a premium to Pool Re only after the
accumulated surplus reaches 1 billions pounds.
14 The agency of public insurance can be a quasi-public entity holding all C-T insurance
risks backed by the capital base, reserves and retained is a case of the agency. In this
case, the actual entity managing the insurance can be a limited liability pool (LLP)
whose resources available to pay claims are given by its own capital base, reserves and
retained profits. A LLP has no claim on government resources (Jaffee and Russell,
2003). In the event of an extreme event policyholders may not be able to receive full
payments for their losses according to the formal status of a LLP. Of course, there is
always the possibility of a government bail the insured a practice that creates its own
problems of moral hazard.
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market alternative is to transfer to investors in the capital market the risk of extreme
events that generate large losses through a suitable security issued by insurance
or reinsurance companies. That security could be the catastrophe bond of the kind
we discussed before.
Still this may not be really a “pure” market solution. In fact, to provide some
“comfort” to investors, the government may acquire Cat Bonds tailored to cover
the highest layers of C-T risks. In this case, the government would play, implicitly,
the role of insurer of last resort through its commitment to buy Cat Bonds to
insure high-risk layers. Another possibility to reduce high layers risk is to open a
credit line by Central Banks to primary insurance companies operating in the
segment of C-T risks, playing the role of creditor of last resort.  In this scheme, the
loan will be oriented to cope with liquidity problems associated with payment of
insurance losses related to C-T risks. The loan can also cover capital of insurance
companies depleted after the occurrence of insurance losses. Assets of the
insurance firm would collateralize the loan and government debt will have priority
over claims on equity by shareholders. However, government debt will have less
priority than the liabilities to insurance policy holders. The key question is whether
the lender of last resort function of government is a substitute of the role of insurer
of last resort. The most likely case is that the market will not accept the solution of
a lender of last resort as a full substitute of an insurer of last resort; if this is the
case, the capitalization of insurance companies exposed to large losses may not
take place without an insurer of last resort.
 Moral hazard issues
Public insurance with mandatory premiums and no deductibles often create
moral hazard problems. In turn, private insurance of risks associated with C-T
events can reflect the risk of low mitigation by the insured agent charging higher
premiums. Of course, too high a premium may “kill” a market, so premiums must be
in line with the capacity and willingness to pay of the clients15.  A combination of
both self-insurance and market insurance would take care of the lower layers
inducing a degree of prevention that reduce moral hazard. In addition, to retention
(e.g. the existence of deductibles) as a device to reduce moral hazard problems, it
is important that the trigger under which the insurance payment is activated is
beyond the control of the “cedent” (the entity that buys the policy or transfer the
risk to other agent).
The fact that the government is likely to play the role of insurer of last
resort for high layers of C-T risk (or directly set-up a public insurance agency for
all terrorist risk) creates, in principle, incentives for undertaking adequate
prevention. Ultimately, the fight against terrorism is the domain, mainly,  of
governments, likewise the prevention of civil conflict.
15 Froot (1999) analyzing the market insurance for natural disasters recommends insurance
contracts and cat bonds that cut losses into layers, so that each contract has an
associated limit, or maximum possible loss.
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6. FINAL REMARKS
Currently, in Latin America there is a clear lack of both public and private
insurance mechanisms for facing the contingencies associated with political
violence, conflict and terrorism. These events have had a significant incidence in
Latin America in the recent past and create losses of human lives, destruction of
assets and entertain social insecurity. Prevention of political violence, conflict and
terrorism requires actions in several fronts: one is the development of a culture of
understanding and peaceful resolution of conflict along with economic and
institutional reforms that lift living standards and reduce inequality and exclusion.
For humanitarian reasons there is a need of public insurance and compensation for
victims and their families in countries that have suffered protracted and costly
internal conflicts.  At the same time, there is a potential scope for developing
market insurance for terrorism and conflict related losses, provided incentives, risk
and moral hazards issues are properly managed.
The development of private insurance needs to adequately manage complex
pricing problems of this kind of risk as well as handle the financial consequences
of  “ extreme events” in which a major terrorist attack (e.g. the New York City’s Twin
Towers collapse on September 11) creates very high losses that strain the financial
capacity of private insurance and reinsurance companies and create large
bankruptcy risk.  The problem of pricing of C-T risk may be particularly serious in
the shaky area of terrorism and conflict, given the lack of precise and well-verified
knowledge of the determinants and dynamics of these phenomena. In turn,
solvency risk can be handled, in principle, through   suitable financial instruments
that shift risk from insurance companies to investors short in risky assets. Well-
structured insurance schemes have the property of partitioning the layers of risk
with self-insurance and market insurance taking care of initial layers of risk, leaving
to international capital markets and public intervention to provide risk protection
against “extreme events”.  Moral hazard problems associated with too little
mitigation and insufficient prevention is another dimension of the development of
adequate insurance of terrorism and conflict risk. In any case, the social benefits of
having adequate prevention and insurance mechanisms for these large
contingencies are bound to be very large in historically conflicting Latin American
societies.
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